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Abstract 
M&A literature reports that the relatedness of an acquiror and a target positively impacts the outcome 
of the deal and the subsequent performance of the new entity. The superior performance is explained by 
resource-based and transaction-cost arguments. In corporate venture capital (CVC), investors and 
startups are reported to benefit both from a “symbiotic relationship” when the CVC’s investment is 
driven by strategic intentions. These relationships result in more positive outcomes for both the startup 
and the CVC, measured among others by startup valuations, innovation output or financial performance. 
Based upon these findings, this study explores on whether industry relatedness between a CVC and a 
startup impacts the startup performance. Using a dataset of 891 CVC deals from European CVC 
investors it investigates how industry relatedness impacts the occurrence of a startup IPO. The results 
of the analysis suggest that no significant relationship exists between industry relatedness and the IPO 
likelihood of the startup. However, this study is subject to several limitations that leave space for future 
research in this domain. 
Resumo 
A literatura sobre fusões e aquisições relata que o relacionamento de um comprador e de uma empresa-
alvo tem um impacto positivo no resultado do negócio e no desempenho subsequente da nova entidade. 
O desempenho superior é explicado por argumentos baseados nos recursos e nos custos de transacção. 
No Corporate Venture Capital (CVC), os investidores e as startups beneficiam ambos de uma "relação 
simbiótica" quando o investimento do CVC é motivado por intenções estratégicas. Estas relações 
resultam em resultados mais positivos tanto para a startup como para o CVC, medidos, entre outros, por 
valorização de startups, produção de inovação ou desempenho financeiro. Com base nestes resultados, 
este estudo explora se a relação em termos de indústria entre um CVC e uma startup tem impacto no 
desempenho da startup. Utilizando uma amostra de 891 negócios de CVC de investidores europeus, este 
projeto investiga de que forma a relação entre a indústria de cada uma das partes tem impacto na 
ocorrência de uma OPI pela startup. Os resultados da análise sugerem que não existe uma relação 
significativa entre a relação entre a indústria e a probabilidade de uma OPI de startup. No entanto, este 
estudo está sujeito a várias limitações que deixam espaço para a investigação futura neste domínio. 
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Corporate venture capital (CVC) is evolving into an increasingly used vehicle for large 
corporations worldwide to invest in innovative startups and to harness financial returns as well 
as to access innovative, potentially disrupting technologies. Even though the model of CVC is 
not new in corporate literature and companies such as Microsoft, Intel or Xerox invested largely 
through CVC around the turn of the millennium, the industry recently sees immense growth 
with CVC investors coming also from non-tech sectors such as fashion, retail or consumer 
goods. This is underlined by the number of CVC deals, which reached 429 in the fourth quarter 
of 2018, constituting a 59% year-over-year growth. The notion that CVC is an increasingly 
important item on CEOs’ agendas is further supported by the fact that 264 new CVCs invested 
for the first time in 2018, representing a 35% year-over-year growth (CB Insights, 2019). 
Considering the recent and ongoing relevance of CVC in the corporate investment context, this 
study aims at providing further evidence on the success-defining mechanisms of CVC deals. 
A large part of CVC literature has so far concentrated on comparing CVC investments with 
those of regular VCs. The most compelling difference is thereby the strategic nature of CVC 
investments. While regular VCs in general exclusively focus on return on investments, CVCs 
are further interested in gaining access to a startup’s resources, technologies or products. On 
the other hand, the CVC supports the startup, e.g. with its process know-how, customer base or 
own existent products (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006; Colombo & Murtino, 2017). Studies report 
that CVC investments with strategic intentions have a higher likelihood of a successful exit 
compared to financially driven investments (Gompers & Lerner, 2000a), have better post-IPO 
(Initial Public Offering) long-run stock returns (Chemmanur et al., 2012) and obtain higher 
startup IPO-valuations than startups backed by VCs (Ivanov & Xie, 2010). 
A common reason why CVCs engage in strategic startup investments are the technologies or 
patents of a startup. Hence, CVC is often termed as a window to new technologies (Maula et 
al., 2013) and a means for corporate investors to foresee potential disruptors and, ideally, to 
diminish the risk of being disrupted by acquiring shares in those new companies, thus gaining 
access to their technology or products. But when doing so, do CVCs really go beyond their 
industry boundaries to detect new technologies or potential competitors? Or do they stay within 
their sector, identifying potential disruptors that are close to their core business?  
CVC literature indicates that the industry relatedness of the CVC and the target startup impacts 
the decision-making process prior the acquisition – both on the CVC as well as on the startup 
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side. Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009) speak about the “paradox of corporate venture capital” 
when adhering to their research findings that startups with products that substitute those of a 
CVC’s parent company are less likely to accept an investment by the latter due to fears of 
imitation and expropriation. The opposite effect of a higher CVC investment likelihood was 
reported when the products of the CVC and the startup have a complementary relationship. The 
literature reports also the impact of industry relatedness once an investment took place, mainly 
in regards to innovation. For example, startups backed by related CVC investments outperform 
unrelated ones in terms of patent output (Chemmanur et al., 2014). 
So, when looking at CVC literature, we can assume that CVC investors have an advantage 
compared to regular VCs due to their strategic valued added to the startup. Also, the relatedness 
of the CVC and the startup seems to impact the likelihood of forming CVC investments in the 
first place and to influence the innovative capabilities of a startup. What remains, however, is 
the question on whether the strategic advantage of a related CVC investment also translates into 
an overall stronger business performance of the startup? The literature on industry relatedness 
provides insights by advocating that related acquisitions are more beneficial to both acquiror 
and target. Among others, it bases its argumentation on the related view which emphasizes the 
capacity of knowledge sharing between investor and target (Oxlex & Sampson, 2004), 
transaction-cost arguments (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) or the resource relatedness between 
both parties (Chang et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the role of industry relatedness within CVC 
investments is still relatively unexplored. While studies such as Achleitner et al. (2014) use the 
concept of industry relatedness to explain trade sales returns of regular VCs when selling their 
shares in a startup to a strategic buyer, there is no further literature on how industry relatedness 
in a CVC-startup dyad impacts the performance of the startup.  
Therefore, the aim of this work is to extend the existing CVC literature by adding the concept 
of industry relatedness as a driver of CVC investment performance and to analyze its role in 
impacting the success of a CVC investment. While most CVC research is conducted using US 
datasets, this study is using a sample of 891 CVC deals of CVC investors headquartered in 
Europe. Thereby it also adds to the further exploration of European CVC deal activities. Similar 
to prior research in CVC, this study uses the occurrence of a startup IPO as a measurement for 
startup performance and, consequently, for a CVC deal’s success. The guiding research 
question hereby is:  
Do startups that are funded by corporate venture capitalists (CVC) perform better when the 
CVC parent and the startup are in the same industry? 
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The outcome of this study indicates that the formation of a CVC-startup dyad relationship with 
an industry relatedness does not increase the likelihood of the startup to achieve an IPO 
compared to CVC-startup investments that are of unrelated nature. This result was supported 
by several robustness tests conducted such as using different industry classifiers or a subsample 
with exclusively listed CVCs. It thus does not confirm previous studies which report an impact 
of industry relatedness, measured by a SIC code proximity, such as Chang et al. (2017) who 
found that industry relatedness strongly predicts a firm’s new product market entry. Also, M&A 
literature suggests different empirical results by reporting that industry relatedness influences 
acquirors’ target preferences (Stellner, 2015) and, based on combined-resources and transaction 
costs theories, that acquirors most likely prefer acquisitions over other investment types if they 
share an industry relatedness with the target (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). In VC literature, 
industry relatedness between a strategic buyer and the startup is reported to negatively influence 
the return of a VC who wants to sell its shares in the focal startup via a trade sale (Achleitner 
et al., 2014). In the context of CVC literature, the insignificant results of this study do not 
confirm findings like those of Ivanov and Xie (2010), who use a qualitative approach to measure 
industry relatedness, and who report higher startup IPO valuations and higher takeover 
premiums for startups when they exhibit an industry relatedness with the invested CVC. Other 
CVC researchers like Chemmanur et al. (2014) confirm the positive impact of industry 
relatedness in CVC dyads by stating that a startup’s innovation performance is higher when the 
CVC investor is in the same industry. 
The dataset of this study revealed a skewed distribution of SIC industries with a large 
concentration of deals that involved CVCs from chemical companies and pharmaceuticals. The 
skewness was even stronger when looking at the CVC investor industries which accounted for 
the sample’s IPOs, showing that CVCs from chemical companies and pharmaceuticals were 
involved in 72,3% of the total startup IPOs. The notion that industry-affiliation, rather than 
industry relatedness, was the driver for a startup IPO was confirmed when adding industry 
control variables to the regression model which were highly statistically significant and at the 
same time rendered the coefficient of industry relatedness insignificant. Furthermore, this 
observation is in line with CVC literature reporting that CVCs that invest frequently in CVC 
investments exhibit higher cumulative abnormal returns compared to sporadic investors as they 
build up a reputation as a stable and trustworthy investment partner (Benson & Ziedonis, 2009). 
The strong representation of pharmaceuticals, chemical companies but also telecoms and media 
companies in the sample underlines that companies are more likely to invest in CVC activities 
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when they operate in industries with rapid technological change and high competitive intensity 
(Basu et al., 2011). Park and Steensma (2012) report significant differences in the likelihood of 
a startup IPO between complementary CVC-startup relationships and substitutional ones that 
could not be confirmed within this study. However, their results indicate that this finding is 
contingent on the industry in which CVC and startup operate, which again is in line with this 
paper’s observation of a significant effect of industry affiliation on the CVC investment 
performance.  
Aside from industry control variables, the total funding of a startup was the only control variable 
that exhibited a highly statistically significant and economically relevant impact on the 
likelihood of a startup IPO. While the notion that startups that receive more funding tend to be 
more successful seems straightforward, it poses the issue of endogeneity when investigating 
success-determining factors of CVC investments. In particular, startups that already received 
high sums of funding might be more attractive for successful investors (e.g. pharmaceuticals), 
thus blurring measures that aim at studying the impact that investors can have on the startup’s 
success. Among others, Masulis and Nahata (2009) and Park and Steensma (2012) reported 
endogeneity in CVC research and proposed measures to alleviate this issue that will be 
discussed within this work. 
The paper commences with a literature review which classifies CVC in the context of corporate 
venturing activities, illustrates the concept of industry relatedness and its impact on CVC-
startup relations, and describes the drivers for CVC investment performances, both 
independently and in the context of industry relatedness. Based upon the literature review, the 
hypothesis of the paper is presented, linking industry relatedness to the performance of the CVC 
investment. Following that, the dataset and the methodology are presented before showing the 
results of the analysis, including descriptive statistics, the main probit regression model and 
robustness tests. Finally, the results of the latter and the study’s limitations will be discussed 
and, based on that, future research potentials suggested.  
2. Theoretical background 
Chapter 2 is a literature review that, first, provides an overview of corporate venture capital 
(CVC), secondly, presents the concept of industry relatedness and its role within CVC and, 
thirdly, further illustrates the performance drivers of CVC investments and how industry 
relatedness impacts these drivers. 
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2.1 Venture capital, corporate venturing and corporate venture capital  
Venture capital (VC) firms are financial intermediaries that invest investors’ money directly in 
portfolio companies (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). As the investment targets are non-listed private 
companies, venture capital is characterized as a type of private equity investment which focuses 
on capital investments in young and innovative companies. Venture capital investments are 
normally minority share investments and come along with representation in the board of the 
invested company and management support (Schefczyk, 2001). Contrary to strategic 
investments of corporations, venture capital firms are driven by financial returns and seek an 
exit of their investment (Metrick & Yasuda, 2011). 
In addition to the financial return driven purpose of venture capital firms, corporate venturing 
or corporate entrepreneurship activities mainly follow strategic goals such as the access to new 
innovations (Chesbrough, 2002). The literature uses the term corporate venturing as an 
umbrella term for all entrepreneurial activities, both internal and external. While internal 
corporate venturing represents investments and foundations of ventures within a company, 
external corporate venturing comprises activities like corporate venture capital (Dauderstaedt, 
2013). Even though the existing literature agrees on the differentiation between internal 
corporate venturing as a means to promote opportunities within the firm and external corporate 
venturing as a focus on opportunities outside the firm in the form of startup investments, many 
corporate venturing units pursue some combination of internal and external venturing 
(Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005). 
Corporate venture capital (CVC), according to Chesbrough (2002), describes the direct 
investment of corporate funds in external startup companies. In alignment with the definition 
provided by Dauderstaedt (2013), CVC does not include corporate venturing activities where 
the startup, even though operating separately from the core business, remains part of the legal 
entity of the parent. The definition of Chesbrough (2002) further excludes the investment of a 
company via an externally managed third-party fund even if the investment vehicle is 
exclusively funded by one investing company. Others, such as MacMillan et al. (2008) or Maula 
(2001), define CVC investments as direct capital investments in startups that can be done by 
third-party funds, dedicated funds or self-managed funds either on their own, alongside 
traditional VCs or in a syndicate of investors. This paper will further use the term CVC 
following the definition of Chesbrough (2002), however, not limiting it solely to self-managed 
corporate-funds but also including other investment vehicles as long as the corporate’s major 
stake in the fund is apparent.  
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2.2 Industry relatedness in corporate venture capital investments 
2.2.1 Definition and role of industry relatedness in investments 
Industry relatedness is a commonly used concept within the acquisition framework. In that 
context it defines the degree to which the acquiring and the target firm are active in related 
markets which indicates that they share common characteristics such as the usage of similar or 
complementary resources, knowledge basis, technologies and products (Lim & Lee, 2016). 
Industry relatedness in acquiror’s target selection and the resulting corporate coherence play a 
key role for the acquiror’s strategy and its growth (Cefis & Rigamonti, 2018). 
Previous works analyzing the role of industry relatedness in the context of mergers & 
acquisition, private equity or (corporate)venture capital ((C)VC) use different terms to describe 
the above-mentioned concept or similar concepts such as market relatedness (Chang et al., 
2017), product-market relationships (Masulis et al., 2009), substitute or complementary 
products between CVC and startup (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2005), relational view on CVC 
(Weber et al., 2016) or strategic fit between CVC parent and venture (Ivanov & Xie, 2010). An 
in-depth explanation and analysis of the different concepts is out of scope of this work and 
henceforth the definition of Lim and Lee (2016) will be used when speaking of industry 
relatedness.  
The understanding of industry relatedness within the context of M&A is based upon the 
differentiation between related and unrelated diversification (Capron, 1999) with empirical 
evidence indicating that related diversification produces more positive outcomes. As the levels 
of expected returns from related acquisitions are higher than for unrelated ones, the chance of 
deal completion is accordingly higher for related acquisitions. In addition, related acquisitions 
exhibit a lower perceived risk due to a high level of knowledge and low information asymmetry 
between acquiror and target. Moreover, acquirors tend to pay a higher premium for related 
businesses (Gondhalekar et al., 2004) which in turn results in a higher acceptance of a deal by 
the target (Wong & O’Sullivan, 2001). In the context of cross-border acquisitions, related and 
strategically motivated take-over deals are more likely to be completed than unrelated and 
financially motivated deals (Lime & Lee, 2016). Villalonga and McGahan (2005) report that 
industry relatedness is associated with the choice of firms on how to enter in external 
acquisitions or partnerships. When acquiror firm and target firm exhibit an industry proximity, 
the target firm is more likely to prefer an acquisition over an alliance, and an alliance over a 
divestiture. Also, relatedness between the acquiror firm’s industry and the activity that is subject 
to the transaction result in the preference of acquisitions over alliances, and alliance over 
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divestitures. Both effects can be explained by a combination of resource-based and transaction-
cost arguments that suggest that greater relatedness leads to lower cost of integration due to 
economies of scale (Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). Another argument for the preference of 
acquisitions is the related view which implies that industry relatedness and the direct 
competition between acquiror and target lead to more integrative and protective governance 
structures to enable knowledge sharing between the two firms (Oxley & Sampson, 2004). 
Chang et al. (2017) provide an additional view on industry relatedness by linking a firm’s entry 
into new product markets to its resource relatedness. Prior research decomposes a firm’s 
resources into market-related and technology-related resources (Nerkar & Roberts, 2004; Sosa, 
2009). While technological resources comprise upstream capabilities such as technological 
knowledge and skills, market-based resources are linked to the brand, existing customer 
relationships and the understanding of customer preferences. Based on the resource-based view, 
Chang et al. (2007) argue that market relatedness does predict market entry, while technological 
relatedness does not. This effect can be explained with the “stickiness” of market resources that 
often are non-transferrable and specialized within a firm, while technological resources are 
tradeable e.g. through licensing agreements. Another argument is that managerial attention is 
generally focused on downstream market-related resources in order to assess product-market 
opportunities or resource acquisition.   
In the context of venture capital investments, Achleitner et al. (2014) report lower returns for 
regular VC firms when they sell their shares via a trade sale to a strategic acquiror that has 
synergetic capabilities. Accordingly, trade sales to strategic acquirors that do not yet operate in 
the same industry as the invested startup yield higher returns for the exiting VC firms.  
2.2.2 Impact of industry relatedness on CVC investment decisions 
The aim for strategic returns in addition to financial returns differentiates CVCs from traditional 
VCs. This strategic view can impact not only the investment decision of the CVC firm to 
acquire a startup but also the decision of the startup on whether to engage in a partnership with 
a CVC firm. One major strategic objective of CVCs is to increase the sales and profits of the 
corporate parent through its investments. Hence, CVC investment seeks to identify startups that 
offer the potential to exploit synergies between the two organizations. If strategic considerations 
overwhelm in the CVC decision-making process, CVCs accept a trade-off of lower direct 
returns from the startup investment as long as it leads to improved performance of the parent 
organization (Chesbrough, 2002). 
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However, the decision to enter in an inter-organizational partnership lies not exclusively with 
the CVC. The startups, mostly young firms with an innovative idea at the core of their business 
model, have also interests and fears that potentially lead to a rejection of a CVC investment. In 
this context, industry relatedness can have a major impact on both the CVC’s and the startup’s 
decision to enter in a dyad relationship. A startup’s product can be a potential substitute and 
could render corporate products and services obsolete. In this case, the corporate investor has 
an incentive to behave opportunistically and to copy the startup’s new technology (Gans et al., 
2001) causing the parties to remain with two diametrically opposed points of view: A CVC firm 
that is unwilling to invest as long as the startup does not disclose its invention and a startup that 
rejects to do so because of fears of imitation and expropriation (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009). 
This “paradox of corporate venture capital” leads to the effect that CVC investments in startups 
with substituting products are less likely to materialize. The lower likelihood of startups to 
accept CVC funding in case of a substitutional relationship contradicts to the view of many 
corporations that perceive CVC activities as an early alert system and vehicle to acquire 
potentially disrupting inventions at an early stage. Also, it contradicts to empirical research 
indicating that strategic CVC-backed investments have a higher likelihood of a successful exit 
compared to financially driven investments (Gompers & Lerner, 2000a), have better post-IPO 
long-run stock returns (Chemmanur et al., 2012) and obtain higher startup IPO-valuations than 
startups backed by independent VCs (Ivanov & Xie, 2010). However, the expropriation fear 
and greater moral hazard concerns are also reflected in higher valuations extracted by a startup 
when it receives funding by a competitive CVC (Masulis & Nahata, 2009). On the other side, 
if the corporate products and the startup’s invention have a complementary relationship, 
Dushnitsky and Shaver (2009) report a higher likelihood of forming a CVC-startup relationship. 
Here, the corporate parent has less incentive to misuse the disclosed information and can benefit 
from the complementarity as it may secures demand to its own products (Anand & Galetovic, 
2004). 
Once a CVC firm is already invested in a portfolio startup, the likelihood of an ultimate 
acquisition of the latter increases when CVC parent and startup operate in a similar industry 
(Dimitrova, 2015). Koehn (2018) argues that depending on a corporate parent’s degree of 
explorative or exploitative capabilities, previous CVC investments in startups influence the 
likelihood of a subsequent entire acquisition of the startup. More specifically, adding the 
concept of industry relatedness, they state that CVCs with a high degree of exploitative 
orientation tend to acquire startups with a high product-market overlap in order to keep their 
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competitive advantage and to strengthen their knowledge base (Siren et al., 2012). On the 
contrary, product-market overlap is negatively associated with an ultimate startup acquisition 
when the CVC has a high degree of explorative orientation.  
2.2.3 Industry relatedness and CVC-startup relationship 
Not only does industry relatedness influence the decision on whether or not to engage in a 
partnership, it also determines the collaboration-, strategy- and governance-decisions once a 
CVC-startup dyad is formed. The relationship between CVC and startup is sensitive to the 
startup’s impact on the CVC parent’s business as the CVC, under some conditions, might 
choose to act adversely to the startup’s interest and success. Contrary to independent VCs, 
CVCs follow also strategic objectives and are mostly integrated within corporate structures next 
to business lines that are potentially sensitive to the startup’s activities. This poses challenges 
to the establishment of stable relationships between CVC and startup unlike it is the case for 
independent VCs who, limited to their financial objectives, rely mostly on their reputation and 
hence achieve greater alignment between them and the startup (Sahlmann, 1990). While an 
industry relatedness between CVC and startup can be of benefit for both parties as the CVC can 
add important non-financial backing, it can also turn out detrimental for the startup as the CVC 
parent is not only interested in the startup’s profits but its total corporate profits (Dushnitsky & 
Shaver, 2009). 
An advantage of CVCs that share the same industry with the startup is the provision of access 
to its current operational capabilities. This allows the startup to use the corporate’s 
manufacturing plants, distribution channels, technology or brands and to adopt the corporate’s 
practices to build, sell or service its products. However, in fast changing business environments 
with potential disruption, relying on existing capabilities might be a liability rather than a 
competitive advantage. In such a case, a CVC investment in an external startup offers the 
corporate the opportunity to develop different capabilities externally and, if successful, to 
integrate them into the core organization (Chesbrough, 2002). The valued-added through CVC 
investors that follow strategic intentions is backed by research reporting that CVC-backed 
startups are able to obtain higher valuations at the IPO and higher takeover premiums than 
startups backed by independent VCs. However, this superior performance in CVC investment 
compared to independent VCs is only observed when the CVC has a strategic focus (Ivanov & 
Xie, 2010). 
Industry relatedness further impacts financial contracting decisions in CVC-startup 
relationships that address the potential conflicts of interest of a CVC investment. Masulis and 
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Nahata (2009) distinguished between competitive and complementary CVC investors based 
upon the degree of overlap in SIC codes between CVC parent and startup. They report that 
startup insiders, such as founders, award lower board representation to competitive CVC 
investors compared to complementary investors. Also, startup insiders retain greater board 
power when competitive CVCs are invested. The startup’s desire to limit the influence of CVCs 
is further reflected in the result that CVCs who are lead investors attain less board representation 
than independent VCs who act as lead investors (Masulis & Nahata, 2009). 
2.3 Performance of CVC investments 
2.3.1 Drivers of performance in CVC investments 
Prior research has shown that financial returns of CVC funds tend to be more volatile compared 
to those of the general venture capital market. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) explain this 
variation in CVC performance with the different orientations and objectives between CVC 
funds. In particular, strategic considerations and the derived, indirect, benefits from the 
investment may overwhelm for some CVC funds. Strategic benefits can include a window to 
new technologies and the connection to innovative startups provides the possibility to access 
those technologies through licensing or acquisitions. In this context the complementarity of 
products and services between CVC parent and startup can enable the increase in demand for 
current or future corporate products. Taking these factors into account, firms that pursue CVC 
activities primarily as a window to new technology create more firm value than CVCs that 
mainly seek financial returns (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2006). One of the main objectives of a new 
startup and its investors is rapid growth, often reflected in growth in sales. While this objective 
is common among CVCs and independent VCs, the channels to reach it differ between these 
two types of investors. Independent VC investments come along with a higher increase in 
headcount, payroll expenses and fixed assets compared to CVC investments. Colombo and 
Murtino (2017) attribute this difference to the symbiotic relationship between corporate and 
startup in which the startup benefits from corporate resources and does not need to hire 
substantially more employees. Other findings show that independent VCs are superior in 
helping startups transform their ideas into viable companies through their skills in developing 
strategy, hiring key employees or obtaining additional financing. CVCs, on the other hand, 
provide startups with commercial and public credibility through their widely known brands, 
thus helping them attracting customers, suppliers and partners. When entering a partnership 
with a technology- and research-focused CVC investor, startups can further benefit from those 
resources by receiving support for their product development (Maula & Murray, 2001).  
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Firms that invest more in internal innovation activities also gain higher returns from CVC 
activities. In particular, the realization of an acquisition benefit for the CVC parent is related to 
the degree of internal innovation activities compared to CVC investment activities. Previous 
findings show that as investments in CVC activities increase in magnitude compared to the 
CVC parent’s R&D expenditures, the beneficial effects of CVC activities on acquisition 
performance diminish (Benson & Ziedonis, 2009). Companies with a strong internal knowledge 
basis exhibit a higher likelihood to leverage technologies obtained through investments, a 
capacity that is often referred to as “absorptive capacity” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Another 
factor that is positively related with the acquisition performance of the CVC is the frequency 
of CVC investments. CVC firms with more stable CVC programs reported higher cumulative 
abnormal returns than investors that invested more sporadically. An interpretation of the 
positive effects of frequent CVC investments is that CVC firms with constant investments build 
up a reputation as a stable and trustworthy investment partner. Establishing such a reputation 
can have a strong impact on the access to potential target startups, especially when considering 
expropriation risks that cause many startups to be reluctant when it comes to corporate 
investments. Thus, frequent CVC investments can positively impact the relationship between 
the CVC and the startup as well as the performance of the CVC investment (Benson & Ziedonis, 
2009).  
Literature shows that the success of CVC investments can be contingent on the industry of 
either the CVC parent or the startup. Dushnitsky and Lenox (2006) report that the 
contribution of CVC activities to CVC parent firm value was highest in the devices and 
information technology sector. The notion that specific industries gain more value from CVC 
investment is supported by the differences in probability at which sectors engage in CVC. 
Specifically, firms that operate in industries with rapid technological change, high competitive 
intensity and weak appropriability engage more in CVC activities (Basu et al., 2011).    
Another factor influencing the performance of CVC activities is the structure of the CVC 
investor. Previous literature argues that CVC units that enjoy full authority over their 
investment portfolio and that operate autonomously perform better as they can act more 
aggressively in their investment choices and are free from corporate resource restrictions 
(Birkinshaw & Hill, 2005; Yang et al., 2016). Drawing upon the exploration and exploitation 
framework (March, 1991), Lee at al. (2018) state that the structural autonomy of the CVC unit 
is positively related to the CVC parent’s explorative innovation performance, while it is 
negatively related with its exploitative innovation performance. 
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Acting at the intersection between traditional venture capital and internal corporate investment, 
CVC firms can struggle in finding the balance between those two approaches which differ 
strongly, e.g. in terms of portfolio evaluation or management compensation (Fleßner et al., 
2019). So instead of successfully creating additional value by leveraging both approaches, CVC 
firms end up weakening each of them, resulting in a “stuck in the middle” syndrome. This 
dilemma can be avoided by facilitating the knowledge transfer between corporate and startup 
by incentivizing corporate employees to share their knowledge as well as through the creation 
of communication protocols that enable the CVC unit to act as a middleman between corporate 
management, corporate employees and the startup, e.g. through its involvement in corporate 
strategy discussions (Fleßner et al., 2019). 
2.3.2 Impact of industry relatedness on CVC investment performance 
The existing literature exhibits several indications that a superior performance of CVCs 
compared to independent VCs can be attributed towards a fit in market, product or technology 
between the CVC firm and the startup. CVC-backed startups tend to be more innovative 
measured by their patenting outcome, although they are younger, riskier and less profitable than 
startups backed by independent VCs. The ability to nurture innovation is not only superior for 
CVCs compared to independent VCs, but also for CVCs that exhibit an industry relatedness 
with the startup compared to CVCs that invested in unrelated startups. The first explanation for 
this outperformance is the technological fit between CVC and startup, while the second one is 
the greater failure tolerance of CVCs compared to independent VCs (Chemmanur et al., 2014). 
Drawing upon the differentiation between a competitive or complementary relation of the CVC 
and the startup, research indicates that a CVC deal’s performance is stronger for a 
complementary relationship rather than for a substitutional one. Assessing the performance of 
startups in terms of the ability of the CVC firm to exit through an IPO, Park and Steensma 
(2012) state that CVC funding is particularly beneficial for startups when they require 
specialized complementary assets or operate in uncertain environments. When specialized 
complementary assets are needed (e.g. hardware manufacturers may require customized 
software for their services), transactions costs in economic exchanges as well as the high costs 
of internal development pose challenges for new startups. Equity funding through an CVC 
investor with complementary assets can therefore mitigate these challenges. Accordingly, the 
positive impact of CVC investments is stronger for startups that seek complementary assets 
than for startups that need generic assets (Park & Steensma, 2012).  
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2.4 Hypothesis  
As illustrated in the previous paragraphs, the relatedness of an investor and the associated 
startup can produce more positive outcomes for both investor and startup than in non-related 
investment dyads. Based upon resource-based and transaction-cost arguments, existing research 
indicates that a strategic investor can share valuable knowledge, resources or supplier- and 
customer-relationships with a startup aside from providing financial funding. The literature on 
industry relatedness and strategic CVC investments indicates that this effect is even stronger 
when both parties share the same industry or products. This access to corporate resources in 
turn should increase the likelihood of a startup to succeed while at the same time the corporate 
investor benefits through the access to new technologies, customers or market segments. Hence, 
I hypothesize that a CVC-startup investment relationship will be more beneficial to the startup’s 
performance if both are from the same industry: 
Hypothesis: CVC funding will be more beneficial to the startup’s 
performance if the CVC parent company and the startup are in the same 
industry. 
3. Data and methodology 
This chapter starts with the sample and its data sources. In the second part it presents the 
different measures for CVC investment performance used in literature before describing the 
dependent, independent and control variables applied in the analysis. It concludes with a 
specification of the econometric model.  
3.1 Sample and data sources 
This study uses deal data from the Private Equity section of Thomson OneBanker (formerly 
VentureXperts) as main source of information on new startups, startup IPO dates, CVC 
investors and CVC funding deals including SIC codes of startups and CVCs to define the 
industry relatedness in the dyad relationships. Thomson OneBanker further provides 
comprehensive information for (C)VC deals including deal sums, age of startups, information 
on investment rounds and composition of the investors syndicate. Considering the analysis of 
European CVC deals, the extensive availability of European deal data was deemed an important 
factor in selecting Thomson OneBanker.  
The initially retrieved dataset from Thomson OneBanker included all deals from CVC investors 
with headquarters in Europe from 01.01.2002 until 31.12.2014. The latter date was selected in 
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order to be able to measure the effect of industry relatedness on a startup’s IPO as most (C)VC 
investors exhibit holding periods of several years before they exit via a startup IPO. It included 
all European corporate private equity and CVC deals in the given time period while excluding 
real estate investments, resulting in 2102 initial dyad observations between a CVC investor and 
a startup. It is not unusual that CVC investors invest several times in the same startup over the 
course of different funding rounds. Hence, to properly measure the outcome of each unique 
dyad relationship and in order to avoid redundant measurements, only the last investment of a 
CVC investor in a startup was taken into the dataset. Valuable information from the removed 
observations of earlier rounds, such as the number of the first participated funding round of a 
CVC, were maintained in the dataset by adding a new column containing the information. This 
step decreased the observations to 1373 CVC deals. 
In a next step, all CVC investors in the dataset that were not owned or did not exhibit a major 
affiliation to a corporate parent were removed as well as those whose parents were financial 
investment companies or state-owned agencies. Furthermore, Thomson OneBanker includes 
deals that are missing data, e.g. for the invested deal sum of a CVC, a problem which is also 
reported by previous works such as Colombo and Murtino (2017) and Ivanov et al. (2010). 
Accordingly, those deals with missing observations were also removed from the dataset, 
resulting in a final dataset comprising 891 deal observations.  
To construct the main independent variable, SIC codes were retrieved from Thomson 
OneBanker. In some cases, SIC codes for either one or both CVC investor and startup were 
missing. Here, the missing SIC codes were added manually by conducting online research about 
the nature of the business and by using the publicly available database “siccode.com”. 
Eventually, of the sample size of 891 observations 210 deals exhibit a CVC-startup relationship 
that is classified as related based on a 2-digit SIC code match. 
For the dependent dichotomous variable startup IPO, data could be retrieved directly from 
Thomson OneBanker. Of the 891 deals 101 resulted in a startup IPO.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Measures of performance of CVC investments 
Similar to regular VC firms, CVC investors seek financial returns through exits such as IPOs 
or trade sales to third-parties (Gompers & Lerner, 2000a). Measuring financial returns, 
Cochrane (2005) uses the expected return, standard deviation, alpha and beta of regular VC 
investments. Another commonly used measure in VC literature (Achleitner et al., 2015; 
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Cochrane, 2005) is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) from the perspective of the VC firm. The 
IRR is calculated on a deal basis and depicts a discount rate of cash outflows and inflows from 
the portfolio company that sets the net present value to zero. However, the possibility of using 
the IRR in C(VC) research is constraint by the access to data with deal sums not being 
necessarily disclosed, especially when (C)VC investors exit through a trade sale.  
An increasingly stronger body in CVC literature accounts for the strategic dimensions of CVC 
investment performance (Benson & Ziedonis, 2006; Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005) as well as the 
different perspectives on a deal’s success by extending the scope to the startup’s performance 
(Chemmanur et al., 2014).  
Measuring the CVC investment performance on the CVC investor side, Benson and Ziedonis 
(2006) use an event study of the stock market’s reaction to the CVC acquisition announcement 
to estimate the discounted future value, net of purchase price from the acquisition. Dushnitsky 
and Lenox (2006) adopt Tobin’s q as a measure of firm value to assess the success of CVC 
investments. According to the authors, Tobin’s q is a good proxy for a firm’s competitive 
advantage and, unlike measures such as the return on investment (ROI), accounts for risks and 
is less liable to reporting distortions. 
Further expanding the performance measurement to strategic dimensions, a large body of 
literature focuses on the innovativeness and technological performance of the CVC investor’s 
parent. While earlier research uses R&D expenditures as a proxy for firms’ innovation 
activities, recent studies use patent-based metrics (Wadhwa et al., 2015; Belderbos et al., 2018) 
such as the number of patents and the number of citations received by patent as these metrics, 
how Chemmanur et al. (2013) argue, capture the actual innovation output and how effectively 
a firm has used its innovation inputs.  
The measurement of performance of CVC investments in the existing literature is not restricted 
to the financial or strategic returns on the CVC acquirer side but further explores the impact on 
startups when they engage in a CVC dyad relationship. For example, Maula and Murray (2001) 
sent a questionnaire to 200 CEOs and founders of US high-tech startups asking them about the 
added- value to their firm by both independent VCs and CVCs. Colombo and Murtino (2017) 
conducted an analysis using the General Methods of Moments methodology to measure the 
acquired firm’s overall economic performance with the logarithm of real sales value as output 
variable and the logarithms of real payroll expenses and real fixed assets as input variables. 
Evaluating the impact of CVC investment on a startup’s innovation performance, Chemmanur 
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et al. (2014) and Lahr and Mina (2016) used the startup’s patenting output as performance 
measure.  
3.2.2 Dependent variable: Startup IPO 
This study uses the binary variable of a successful IPO of the invested startup as the dependent 
variable to measure the CVC investment’s performance. Among the exit strategies of VC and 
CVC investors, an IPO or a trade sale belong to the most utilized forms (Achleitner et al., 2014; 
Gompers & Lerner, 2000a). As venture capital is by definition the investment in private, non-
listed firms, deal sums and other investment information are not necessarily subject to public 
disclosure. Hence, the large part of VC and CVC research uses publicly available data such as 
from startup IPOs or CVC investors’ annual reports while only a few use proprietary data to 
analyze trade sale performances (Achleitner et al., 2014). Whether or not an investment resulted 
in an IPO is a commonly used proxy to measure the success of a CVC investment and can be 
of advantage for both CVC investors and startups alike (Gompers & Lerner, 2000a). Comparing 
VC to CVC investments, Guo et al. (2015) for example report that CVC-backed firms receive 
larger investments than VC-backed firms and that a larger investment increases the likelihood 
of an IPO. Using a dataset of firms from the high-tech sector, Park and Steensma (2012) found 
that CVC funding increases the likelihood of an IPO when the startups require specialized 
complementary assets or operate in uncertain environments. From an investor’s point of view, 
empirical data shows that exits via IPOs result in higher return on investments compared to 
exits via a trade sale (Park & Steensma, 2012). From the entrepreneurial perspective, the 
relative attractiveness of an IPO might be even more salient. This is due to the convention that 
VC investors normally receive preferred shares granting them, in case of a trade sale, the right 
to receive at least a payoff equal to their initial investment before other investors or founders 
get paid out (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003). In case of an IPO, however, those preferred shares 
need to be converted into common shares, thus explaining a higher appeal of an IPO to the 
entrepreneur (Park & Steensma, 2012). Park and Steensma (2012) further argue that many 
acquisitions during the dot-com bust period of 2001-2003 were actually failures and that 
therefore trade sales acquisitions might not be classified as a successful outcome. This view is 
supported by studies that observed that average trade sales acquisition prices in the pre-dot-com 
bust period were $190 million in the high-tech industry but only $49 million after 2000 
(Waguespack & Fleming, 2009). Following the above-mentioned arguments this paper uses the 
startup IPO as a proxy to measure the successful outcome of a CVC deal given the positive 
17 
 
impact on both startup and CVC investors reported in the literature. It thereby counts all startup 
IPOs that took place between January 2002 and March 2020. 
3.2.3 Main independent variable: Industry relatedness  
The main independent variable of this study is industry relatedness, measured through SIC-
Code proximity on firm level between the invested startup and CVC parent company. As 
documented in paragraph 2.2.1, the concept of industry relatedness is a widely applied approach 
to measure effects in M&A or venture capital. The methodologies to measure industry 
relatedness in the existing literature, however, differ.  
The Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code-based methodology applied in this study is a 
commonly utilized measure for industry relatedness in M&A and CVC research (Achleitner et 
al., 2015; Chang et al., 2017; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005). It consists of a 4-digit code with 
a hierarchical nested structure in which each level is represented by a digit (Cefis & Rigamonti, 
2018). The first two digits represent the major industry sector to which a business belongs 
whereas the third and fourth digits indicate the sub-classification and the specialization, 
respectively (UK Office for National Statistics, 2007).  When comparing the SIC codes of two 
firms, a SIC code matching at the 2-digit and 3-digit level generally indicates a strong 
relatedness (Achleitner et al., 2015). In the context of a trade sale, however, Achleitner et al. 
(2015) define a horizontal integration between a strategic buyer and a startup only when both 
companies share the identical 4-digit SIC code. Other scholars (Stellner, 2015; Valentini & Di 
Guardo, 2012; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) did not use a binary approach to classify 
relatedness SIC-based but set the variable to zero if the 2-digit SIC codes did not overlap, to 
one if the acquiror and the startup shared the same 2-digit SIC code but not the 3-digit SIC 
codes, equal to two if both parties shared the 3-digit SIC code but not the 4-digit SIC codes, 
and to three if they shared the exact same 4-digit SIC code.  
The regression analysis of this study will take the SIC code-based relatedness measure as a 
binary variable on deal level setting it equal to zero if there is not an overlap of the 2-digit SIC 
codes between CVC parent firm and startup and to one if both firms share the same 2-digit SIC 
codes following Achleitner et al. (2015) and Capron (1999) that a strong relatedness can be 
assumed on the 2-digit SIC code level. 
One shortcoming of the SIC-based approach is that it neglects the conditions under which firms 
combine resources to create value and that it leaves significant strategic relationships among 
industries unclear (Cefis & Rigamonti, 2018). A measure of industry relatedness that aims to 
alleviate these issues is the co-occurrence analysis. This approach is based on the survivor 
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principle, first proposed by Teece et al. (1994), which implies that due to economic competition 
only those market participants survive that exhibit the most efficient mix of activities (Lien & 
Klein, 2013). In the existing literature on diversification, the co-occurrence analysis has shown 
its ability to outperform SIC-based measures, for example for predicting firms’ diversification 
decisions (Lien & Klein, 2009). Cefis and Rigamonti (2018) extend co-occurrence and survivor 
principle-based relatedness measures to fit the acquisitions framework. They propose a 
unidirectional index that can be applied as an independent variable in econometric models. 
Building upon the co-occurrence method but adding directional flows to the observed firm level 
relationship, the index can be particularly useful for dyad acquiror-target relationships or other 
settings where the direction of flows is essential.  
Other scholars like Cassiman et al. (2003) pursued a qualitative approach to assess the industry 
relatedness of the two deal entities. Conducting an in-depth analysis of 31 M&A deals, they 
assessed the relatedness by directly asking the parties involved in the deal with a questionnaire. 
When startups decide to go public, they are obliged to disclose business-related information 
and the corresponding IPO prospectus can offer valuable insights on a firm’s fields of activities 
and its business strategy. Prior research has utilized the disclosed information to gain insights 
on industry relatedness between startup and acquiror. Ivanov and Xie (2010) for example 
searched for mentions in the IPO prospectus of the startup on whether there are any strategic 
relationships or alliances between startup and CVC parent. 
Masulis and Nahata (2009) note that SIC code-based measures only provide a relative broad 
description of the relatedness between two firms and that startups are generally concentrated in 
a small number of SIC codes. A large body in CVC literature therefore uses the CorpTech 
Directory (Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Masulis & Nahata, 2009; Chang et al., 2017) to classify 
industry relatedness. The pre-dominant argument to use the CorpTech Directory is its finer and 
more detailed classification of industries and product markets for companies, including startups, 
compared to SIC-based measurements. For example, a company that is allocated to a single 4-
digit SIC code might be allocated to several product categories based on the CorpTech 
Directory, thus accounting for the more diverse nature of firms’ product portfolios (Masulis & 
Nahata, 2009). However, the CorpTech Directory predominantly covers US companies and 
hence its database does not fit to this study’s sample of European CVC investors.  
This study will use the SIC code-based methodology due to its wide acceptance and application 
in literature, practical purposes of accessibility as well as resource limitations. It, however, 
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acknowledges the limitations of this methodology and emphasizes the potential for future 
research in this field using different ways of measuring industry relatedness.   
3.2.4 Control variables  
The study applies a number of control variables that can potentially influence the performance 
of a startup. The application of a commonly used control variable accounting for investors’ size 
through measures such as market capitalization or total assets value is not feasible with the 
study’s dataset due to a large number of non-listed CVC investors that do not disclose these 
financial indicators. Hence, the dichotomous variable CVC listed is included to account for this 
issue.  
As more successful startups are more likely to receive higher funding by investors, the total 
funding of the startup is added as a control variable with the natural log of the measure to reduce 
the skewness of the model and to increase normality. Also, successful startups more likely 
attract a higher number of investors. Therefore, the natural log of total number of funds invested 
in the startup is also controlled for in the model. Following the same line of reasoning, startups 
with more promising prospects potentially exhibit higher investments per individual investor. 
Hence, the total equity invested by the CVC in startup is incorporated into the regression with 
the natural log of the variable.  
In line with Ivanov et al. (2010) and Park and Steensma (2012) controls for the round number 
of the last investment of a CVC-startup dyad and the round number of the earliest investment 
of the CVC in the startup were added. Further, the age of the startup at the last investment (in 
months) is included in the model. Again, the natural log was taken for all three variables.  
On the CVC level, following Masulis and Nahata (2009), the dichotomous variable CVC lead 
investor is included. It reflects the nurturing capabilities of corporate investors that help startups 
and potentially positively impact the startup’s success. In Masulis and Nahata (2009) the 
variable takes the value of 1 if the CVC investor participated in the first investment round and 
invested the largest amount in the startup across all funding rounds. Due to limited access to 
information and in scope with this work, the CVC lead investor variable will take the value of 
1 if the CVC investor participated in the first investment round and, different to Masulis and 
Nahata (2009), if it accounts for at least 50% of the total funding of the startup. At the CVC 
level, with the natural log of CVC total deals number, another variable is integrated to control 
for the experience of a CVC investor as more active and experienced CVC investors are more 
likely to add value to startups (Benson & Ziedonis, 2009). 
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Lastly, it controls for year of investment of the CVC in the startup (in case of several 
investments the year of the last investment is taken) and industry fixed effects (based on 2-digit 
SIC codes) by using year and industry dummy variables. 
3.2.5 Specification of econometric model 
After having explained the sample of this study and the proxies used as dependent and 
independent variables we can rephrase the hypothesis of this paper to specify the econometric 
model: 
A CVC investment is more likely to result in a startup IPO when the 
CVC investor and the target startup share the same 2-digit SIC code. 
The dependent variable of this paper is the occurrence of a startup IPO, taking the value of 1 in 
case of an occurrence of an IPO and 0 in case of no IPO. Due to the dichotomous nature of the 
dependent variable, following the approach of Park and Steensma (2012), this study applies a 
probit regression model. According to Wooldridge (2010) the probit model can be derived from 
the binary response model, an index model that takes 
P (y= 1|x) = G(xß) = p(x), where 0 < G(z) < 1 
The probit model then constitutes a special case of the above equation  




where ∅(𝑧) is the standard normal density 
∅(𝑧) = (2𝜋)−1/2 exp (−𝑧2/2).  
Hence, the probit function of this study would be 
Pr(𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑝_𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑖 = 1|𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖  , 
where the effect of industry relatedness is measured upon the probability of the startup realizing 
an IPO. Here, however, the study faces the issue of endogeneity, a common phenomenon in 
CVC literature when measuring a variable’s effect on a CVC deal or on the subsequent 
performance of the CVC acquiror or the target startup. Among others, Gompers and Lerner 
(2001b) reported this issue when measuring the impact of VC capital inflows on VC startup 
valuations. Lahr and Mina (2016) observed endogeneity issues when drawing inferences on 
how a VC investment impacts the patent output of the startup and Colombo and Murtino (2017) 




Concerning this study, endogeneity could impact the validity of the results of the analysis as 
the effect of industry relatedness between CVC parent and startup on the likelihood of success 
of the CVC investment (proxied by the IPO of the startup) might not be unidirectional. 
Moreover, the prospect of a successful startup investment could be more likely in specific 
industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals sector), thus attracting particularly pharmaceuticals as CVC 
investors and making startups more likely to accept funding by those investors from the same 
industry in the first place. 
Park and Steensma (2012), who study the impact of the dichotomous variable “CVC 
investment” on the “likelihood of an IPO of the invested startup”, report no endogeneity due to 
self-selection as the startups are less likely to choose to pursue an IPO during the initial phase 
of raising CVC funds. However, according to the authors, resource needs and environmental 
conditions can still influence startups to self-select into raising CVC funding. To alleviate the 
problem of endogeneity, they propose a bivariate probit model as it is deemed appropriate for 
obtaining causal inferences in case both the dependent and the main independent variable are 
of dichotomous nature (Park & Steensma, 2012; Wooldridge, 2010). To isolate the variation in 
the predictor variable X which is not explained by the outcome variable Y they introduce a first 
equation with the treatment effect (with Y as the dependent variable and X as the main 
independent variable) and a second equation that estimates the selection effect with X as the 
dependent variable. Besides other control variables, the latter contains an instrumental variable 
Z that is highly correlated with the endogenous variable X and not correlated with the outcome 
variable Y of the treatment effect equation. Applying the methodology to this paper, an 
instrumental variable Z would be highly correlated to the formation of a related CVC-startup 
deal relationship but uncorrelated to the IPO of the startup. Table 5 in chapter 4.2 shows the 
pairwise correlations of all variables for which data was gathered in this study. The variable 
that exhibits the strongest correlation with the main independent variable related is the natural 
log of CVC total deal number (r = 0,1144; p <0,001). However, as this variable is even stronger 
related to the dependent variable startup IPO (r = 0,1503; p <0,001) it does not suit as an 
instrument. As the collected variables cannot be applied as instruments and further data was not 
available due to limitations in access, this paper can only make theoretical assumptions about a 
possible instrument and consequently needs to acknowledge the endogenous nature of its main 
independent variable industry relatedness as a limitation in interpreting its results.  
Wooldridge (2010) points out the suitability of exogenous factors such as time or geography as 
an instrument and Park and Steensma (2012) use the “availability of corporate venture capital” 
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in a certain year to explain variations in their endogenous variable that can not be explained by 
the dependent variable. In the case of this paper, the exogenous factor could be the degree of 
formal organization and networking within a certain industry. In particular, the number of 
industry-specific events, congresses, trade fairs and investment pitches or the existence of 
dedicated lobby groups or associations could positively impact the likelihood of a CVC and a 
startup from the same industry to connect and to form an investor/investee relationship. On the 
other side, the degree of an industry’s formal organization or networking probably does not 
impact the likelihood of a startup to go public. As this hypothesis cannot be tested in the scope 
of this paper, the idea and further elaborations on a suitable instrument can be subject to future 
research in this area. 
4. Analysis 
Chapter 4 explores the descriptive statistics of the dataset before presenting the results of the 
main probit regression and the following robustness tests. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 explores basic summary statistics of the variables in the dataset. It shows that 11,3% 
out of the sample’s 891 deal observations where a startup received an investment by a European 
CVC investor between 01.01.2002 and 31.12.2014 resulted in a startup IPO. Furthermore, out 
of the 891 deal dyads 23,6% exhibited an industry relatedness between the startup and the CVC 
investor’s parent based on a 2-digit SIC code match. 
Even though the sample does not solely consist of CVCs with listed parent companies, listed 
CVCs account for the majority of CVCs in the sample. In particular, 78% of deals observed 
include a CVC whose parent firm is publicly listed. In 11% of the deals the CVC was also 
acting as the lead investor within the investor syndicate. 
The summary statistics show the heterogeneity among startup and deal characteristics, depicted 
by the high standard deviations among some of the variables. This observation is particularly 
evident in the case of the total funding received by the startup where the mean amount received 
is $75,21 Mil. with a standard deviation of 244,0 and a median of $31,24 Mil, respectively. The 
observed skewness supports the notion that comparably few startups that are successful (or 
promise to be so in the future), receive much more funding than the larger part of other startups 
that do not share the same success prospects. Hence, the means of this and other variables that 
exhibit high standard deviations, such as for the CVC’s total amount of equity invested in a 
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startup, should be interpreted cautiously. For the purpose of alleviating the skewness of these 
variables for the probit regression they were transformed into their logarithmic form (Table 1 
Panel B). 
 
Table 1. Sample summary statistics and variable overview 
 
DESCRIPTION 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N mean sd 
     
PANEL A VARIABLE OVERVIEW    
  
 
1 if startup went public 
 
 
1 if startup and CVC parent share the same 2-digit 
SIC code 
 
1 if CVC parent is listed at last CVC funding 
Total number of deals of CVC at last CVC funding 
 
 
Total amount of funding received by startup at last 
CVC funding (Mil $) 
Startup age at last CVC funding (in months) 
Total number of funds invested in the startup at 
last CVC funding 
 
 
Last round where CVC invested in startup 
Earliest round where CVC invested in startup 
Total amount CVC invested in startup (Mil $) 
1 if CVC investor invested in startup’s first 
funding round and accounts for min. 50% of 
total equity invested 
 
Dummy variables to control for year effects at year 
of last investment 
Dummy variables to control for CVC industry 
fixed effects based on 2-digit SIC code 
classification 
   
Dependent variable    
(1)  startup_IPO 891 0.113 0.317 
    
Main independent variable    
(2)  related 891 0.236 0.425 
    
CVC-related controls    
(3)  CVC_listed 891 0.780 0.414 
(4)  CVC_total_deals_number 891 72.98 65.77 
    
Startup-related controls    
(5)  startup_total_funding 891 75.21 244.0 
    
(6)  ageatfinancing_months 891 68.89 46.38 
(7)  total_no_funds 891 9.544 7.079 
    
    
Dyad-related controls    
(8)  round_number 891 3.756 2.782 
(9)  earliest_round 891 2.798 2.176 
(10)  CVC_total_equity 891 6.174 10.26 
(11)  CVC_lead_investor 891 0.110 0.313 
    
    
Year and industry controls    
(12)    investment_year  891 - - 
    
(13)    2_digit_SIC_CVC  891 - - 
      
PANEL B NATURAL LOG OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
        
(4)  log_CVC_total_deals     891 3.729 1.225 
(5)  log_startup_total_funding     891 3.208 1.615 
(6)  log_age_at_financing     891 3.965 0.842 
(7)  log_total_no_funds     891 1.964 0.821 
(8)  log_round_number     891 1.057 0.747 
(9)  log_earliest_round     891 0.767 0.712 
(10) log_CVC_total_equity     891 1.149 1.198 




Table 2 Panel A provides an overview of the industries in which startups attracted the highest 
amount of funding from all external investors. The sample shows that startups from the SIC 
category “Business services”, which includes sectors such as advertising and pre-packaged 
software, received the highest total amount of funding with $14.382 Mil. They were followed 
by startups from the “Chemicals and pharmaceuticals” industry with $12.785 Mil. and startups 
from “Engineering and management services” with $8.801 Mil. Panel B illustrates the CVC 
parent industries that invested most in startups between 2002 and 2015. Here, “Chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals” invested by far the highest amount in venture capital with $2.205 Mil., 
followed by “Communications”, which comprises telecom companies ($609 Mil.), and 
“Printing and publishing ($460,81).  
The strong concentration of CVC investments in investors from chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
can not just be explained by industry-specific factors such as high R&D intensity but also when 
taking a look on the composition of the sample. Of the 891 deal observations, 315 involve a 
CVC investor that belongs to the 2-digit SIC code classification 28 of chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals.  
Besides impacting the distribution of equity invested among CVC investors, the high 
concentration of SIC-28 companies is further reflected in the distribution of related 
relationships among the industry classifications (Table 3). Of the 210 related deal relationships, 
149 are composed of companies from the chemicals and pharmaceuticals sector. The 
consequences of this skewed distribution of related deals among SIC sectors will be further 
evaluated in the discussion part of this paper. 
Startups from the “Chemicals and pharmaceuticals” sector account also for the largest number 
of startup IPOs with 40 IPOs out of 101 total IPOs in the dataset, followed by startups from 
“Engineering services” with 26 and “Instruments” with 11 IPOs (Table 4). Similar to the 
previously observed distribution of CVC equity invested in startups, the dominance of chemical 
companies and pharmaceuticals is even stronger on the CVC investor side. Here, the SIC-28 
industry counts 73 IPOs while the two second largest investor industries, “Printing and 







Table 2. Overview of the largest industries on startup- and CVC-level by investments 
PANEL A: 10 largest startup industries by total funding received 
Startup 2-
digit SIC  
SIC description Startup total 
funding (Mil. $) 
73 Business services including advertising and pre-packaged software 14382.02 
28 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 12785.15 
87 Engineering and management services 8801.87 
37 Transportation equipment 5424.17 
36 Electronic and other electric equipment 5208.49 
57 Furniture and home furnishing stores 4829.63 
38 Instruments and related products 3757.66 
59 Miscellaneous retail 1893.78 
48 Communications 1850.23 
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics 1161.76 
PANEL B: 10 largest CVC industries by total equity invested in startups 
CVC 2-
digit SIC  
SIC description Total equity invested 
in startup (Mil. $) 
28 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 2205.12 
48 Communications 609.06 
27 Printing and publishing 460.81 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 370.99 
54 Selling food for home preparation and consumption 285.39 
20 Manufacturing or processing foods and beverages for human 
consumption 
275.38 
49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 261.30 
36 Electronic and other electric equipment 121.34 
37 Transportation equipment 116.79 








Table 3. Distribution of related deal relationships among industries 
Matching  
2-digit SIC 













Total of 210 related CVC-startup dyad deal relationships  
 
Apart from the apparent dominance of chemical and pharmaceutical companies in CVC 
transactions, Table 2 and Table 4 offer valuable insights on how the industry landscape has 
changed in the first and a half decade of this century. When looking at the constituents of the 
startup industries in both tables we see sectors such as advertising and software (SIC 73) or 
engineering (SIC 26) that received the largest amount of funding and that account for the fourth 
and second highest number of startup IPOs, respectively. On the other side of both tables, when 
looking at the constituents of the CVC industries, we see telecommunications companies (SIC 
48), publishers (SIC 27) or utilities (SIC 49) dominating the total equity spending of CVCs.  
 








SIC description Number of 
startup IPOs 
28 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 40 28 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 73 
87 Engineering and management services 26 27 Printing and publishing 6 
38 Instruments and related products 11 48 Communications 6 
73 Business services including advertising 
and pre-packaged software 
8 35 Industrial machinery and equipment 5 
36 Electronic and other electric equipment 6 73 Business services including 
advertising and pre-packaged 
software 
3 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 3 49 Electric, gas and sanitary services 2 
57 Furniture and home furnishing stores 2 54 Selling food for home preparation 
and consumption 
2 
59 Miscellaneous retail 2 20 Manufacturing or processing foods 
and beverages for human 
consumption 
1 
13 Oil and gas extraction 1 36 Electronic and other electric 
equipment 
1 
48 Communications 1 50 Wholesale trade-durable goods 1 
78 Motion pictures 1 80 Health services 1 
Total number of startup IPOs: 101; observed time horizon between 01.01.2002 and 01.03.2020 
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This observation is in line with the surge of young companies with software- and internet-based 
business models from the early 2000s on which attracted large sums of venture capital. Also, 
seeing rather established industries like telecommunications or publishing being among the 
largest CVC investors does support the argument for CVC as a window to new technologies 
and innovation for mature industries (see chapter 2.3.1). 
Table 5 illustrates Pearson’s correlation between all variables of the probit regression model 
(except year and industry dummies) including the respective p-values of the correlation 
coefficients. The dependent variable startup_IPO exhibits a low correlation (r = 0,1351) with 
the main independent variable related (p <0,001). The strongest correlation of the dependent 
variable that can be reported is with the natural log of the startup’s total funding (r = 0,2951; p 
<0,001). In addition, startup_IPO shows significant correlations with log_CVC_total_equity 
(r= 0,2302; p <0,001) and log_total_no_funds (r = 0,2199; p <0,001). This underlines the view 
that successful startups are, first, those that receive the most funding prior an IPO, second, the 
ones where CVC investors are willing to invest the highest amounts of equity on an individual 
level, and, third, those that exhibit the largest (C)VC investor syndicates. 
Unsurprisingly, the strongest overall observed correlation (r = 0,7538; p <0,001) is between the 
two logarithmic forms of the variables “startup total funding” and “total number of funds 
invested in the startup” as with more investors that invest in a company, the total amount of 
funding is more likely to be higher too. 
 
Table 5. Correlations 
Correlations (N = 891): correlation coefficient (p-value)  
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) startup_IPO 
 
1.0000           
(2) related 0.1351 
(0.0001) 
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4.2 Probit regression 
Before conducting a probit regression on the dichotomous variable startup_IPO, it is tested 
whether there exists a significant association between startup_IPO and the main independent 
variable related, which indicates an industry relatedness based on a 2-digit SIC code match. 
Due to the dichotomous nature of both variables the Pearson chi-squared test is being applied. 
The association between the variables is measured by using the two following hypotheses: 
H₀: The IPO of a startup in a CVC-startup dyad relationship and the industry relatedness of the 
two entities are independent from each other. 
H₁: The IPO of a startup in a CVC-startup dyad relationship and the industry relatedness of the 
two entities are not independent from each other. 
 
Table 6. Chi-squared test 
 
 
According to Table 6 the likelihood chi-squared statistics is 16.2951 (p < 0,001). Hence, we 
can state at a 1% significance level that the two variables are related and reject H₀ that both are 
independent. 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the probit regression model with the marginal effects of the 
coefficients. As illustrated in the table, the main independent variable and all controls were 
subsequently added to the model. Furthermore, the model was corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
The hypothesis of this study predicted that CVC funding would be more beneficial to a startup’s 
performance when the CVC investor’s parent and the startup are from the same industry. The 
final regression result in Table 6 Model 12 shows an economic and statistically insignificant 
effect of industry relatedness (related) between a CVC and a target startup on the startup’s IPO. 
Thus, the result does not support the paper’s hypothesis. The pseudo R² of Model 12 is 0,2435. 
Table 6 shows that the variable related took an economic and statistical insignificance only 
          Pearson chi2(1) =  16.2591   Pr = 0.000
     Total         681        210         891 
                                             
         1          61         40         101 
         0         620        170         790 
                                             
         O           0          1       Total
startup_IP          related
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after controlling for industries on the CVC side, which were added as fixed effects based on 2-
digit SIC codes (Model 12). When ignoring industry fixed effects, as in Models 1 to 11, the 
coefficient of the variable related is highly statistically significant on a 1% level.  If Model 11 
would be interpreted, we could state on a 1% significance level that a related relationship 
between CVC and startup increases the likelihood of a startup IPO by 7,59%.  
The SIC codes dummy variables added in Model 12 all exhibit highly statistically significant 
coefficients on a 1% level. As seen in Table 4, the dataset exhibits a comparably small number 
of SIC industries on the CVC side that account for the observed startup IPOs in this sample. 
Hence, there are CVC SIC industry groups that consist exclusively of deals where no startup 
IPO was observed. As the outcome of the dependent variable will be always zero for these 
observations, they don’t possess any explanatory power for the likelihood of the occurrence of 
an IPO and were therefore automatically dropped from the sample, resulting in the 758 
observations in Model 12.  
The variable log startup total funding positively impacts the likelihood of a startup IPO and is 
highly statistically significant at a 1% level throughout all models. A one million increase in 
the funding of a startup increases the likelihood of a startup IPO by 5%. The log of total equity 
invested of a CVC in a particular startup shows a weak positive economic effect at a 10% 
significance level in Models 4 to 10. When adding year and industry controls, however, this 
variable is rendered statistically insignificant. Startup age at the last financing round has also a 
weak positive effect on the startup IPO in Model 11 and 12 which is significant at a 10% and 
at a 5% level, respectively. The other control variables of the probit analysis are statistically 
insignificant at every stage of the model. Thus, an influence of these variables on the likelihood 











Table 7. Probit regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
related 0.101*** 0.0950*** 0.0766*** 0.0745*** 0.0743*** 0.0742*** 0.0733*** 0.0731*** 0.0723*** 0.0688*** 0.0759*** 0.00908 
 (0.0292) (0.0287) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0256) (0.0262) (0.0216) 
CVC_listed  0.0359 -0.00409 -0.00202 -0.00627 -0.00614 -0.00736 -0.00968 -0.0101 -0.0224 -0.0187 -0.0583 
  (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0252) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0273) (0.0258) (0.0442) 
log_startup_total_fundi
ng ¹ 
  0.0564*** 0.0488*** 0.0460*** 0.0461*** 0.0429*** 0.0443*** 0.0435*** 0.0426*** 0.0411*** 0.0500*** 
   (0.00646) (0.00731) (0.00840) (0.00846) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.00956) (0.0117) 
log_CVC_total_equity ¹    0.0158* 0.0162* 0.0161* 0.0176* 0.0176* 0.0177* 0.0166* 0.0132 0.0108 
    (0.00836) (0.00835) (0.00865) (0.00935) (0.00928) (0.00920) (0.00910) (0.00912) (0.00997) 
log_round_number      0.0106 0.0116 0.00891 -0.00214 -0.00215 -0.00619 -0.0112 -0.00815 
     (0.0133) (0.0193) (0.0199) (0.0211) (0.0209) (0.0211) (0.0204) (0.0228) 
log_earliest_round      -0.00144 -0.00198 -0.00182 -0.00201 -0.000447 0.00411 0.00992 
      (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0191) 
log_total_no_funds ¹       0.00884 0.00924 0.00626 0.00629 0.00564 -0.0115 
       (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0184) (0.0217) 
log_age_at_financing ¹        0.0162 0.0166 0.0183 0.0215* 0.0254** 
        (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0125) 
CVC_lead_investor         -0.0241 -0.0201 -0.0191 -0.0442 
         (0.0482) (0.0498) (0.0454) (0.0301) 
log_CVC_total_deals ¹          0.0111 0.00842 0.00105 
          (0.00786) (0.00745) (0.0100) 
_Iinvestmen_2003           -0.0173 -0.00885 
           (0.0529) (0.0602) 
_Iinvestmen_2004           0.0661 0.131 
           (0.0871) (0.123) 
_Iinvestmen_2005           0.0897 0.174 
           (0.102) (0.148) 
_Iinvestmen_2006           0.0996 0.136 
           (0.100) (0.122) 
_Iinvestmen_2007           0.0116 0.0220 
           (0.0613) (0.0707) 
_Iinvestmen_2008           -0.0246 -0.00167 
           (0.0436) (0.0633) 
_Iinvestmen_2009           0.0266 0.0475 
           (0.0680) (0.0848) 
_Iinvestmen_2010           0.0189 0.0164 
           (0.0748) (0.0732) 
_Iinvestmen_2011           0.0475 0.0524 
           (0.0766) (0.0855) 
_Iinvestmen_2012           0.0170 0.0353 
           (0.0620) (0.0778) 
_Iinvestmen_2013           0.0984 0.0931 
           (0.0895) (0.0942) 
_Iinvestmen_2014           0.0448 0.0393 
           (0.0635) (0.0661) 
_I_digit_CV_5            0.950*** 
            (0.0159) 
_I_digit_CV_6            0.968*** 
            (0.0197) 
_I_digit_CV_7            0.933*** 
            (0.0643) 
_I_digit_CV_10            0.968*** 
            (0.0256) 
_I_digit_CV_11            0.944*** 
            (0.0170) 
_I_digit_CV_16            0.965*** 
            (0.0455) 
_I_digit_CV_17            0.949*** 
            (0.0135) 
_I_digit_CV_18            0.939*** 
            (0.0117) 
_I_digit_CV_19            0.937*** 
            (0.0197) 
_I_digit_CV_24            0.960*** 
            (0.00875) 
_I_digit_CV_26            0.937*** 
            (0.0120) 
             
Observations 891 891 891 891 891 891 891 891 891 891 891 758 
* significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level. ¹ at time of last CVC investment in the focal startup. Pseudo R²: 0,2435 
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4.3 Robustness tests 
Several tests were conducted to ensure the robustness of the results achieved in the probit 
regression. While the first and the second robustness tests used smaller and larger sample sizes, 
respectively, the third and fourth used the initial sample but different measures of calculating 
the main independent variable industry relatedness by using a 4-digit SIC code match and the 
Fama French 12 industry classification, respectively.  
The first robustness check takes a subsample of the dataset used in the main regression of this 
paper. The subsample consists solely of observations where the parent company of the CVC 
was publicly listed at the time of its last investment in the startup. The original dataset included 
deal observations with privately-owned CVC parent companies which often do not disclose 
financial information like total assets. Hence, in the initial regression it was not possible to 
control for the CVC parent’s size by using total assets or market capitalization as done usually 
in CVC research. The subsample has 694 observations. The control variable CVC total assets, 
which is the total assets of a CVC parent company in thousand $ at the year prior to the last 
investment in the associated startup, is added with the natural log to the model. The values for 
total assets were retrieved from Datastream in the CVC parents’ local currencies and 
subsequently converted to USD taking the exchange rate of 31.12.XX of the respective year via 
conversion tables provided on ofx.com. The binary control variable CVC listed is consequently 
removed from the model. Again, Pearson’s chi-squared test is conducted with a statistical 
significance level at 1%, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that startup IPO and related are 
independent from each other. As in the main regression, all variables were added subsequently 
to the model and the model was corrected for heteroskedasticity. The result of the probit 
regression (Appendix 2) exhibits a statistically insignificant coefficient for related and therefore 
supports the results of the main regression. However, unlike in the main regression where the 
coefficient was highly statistically significant until adding industry dummies, related is only 
weakly statistically significant at a 10% level before adding industry dummies (Model 11). The 
newly added control for a CVC parent’s total assets has a negative impact (ß = -0,028; p <0,05) 
on the likelihood of the target startup’s IPO. 
The second robustness test was a probit regression conducted on a larger dataset of European 
CVC investment deals. Due to missing data in Thomson OneBanker, this robustness test does 
not control for startup age at financing round, the CVC’s total equity invested in a startup as 
well as not for the binary variable CVC lead investor. As for the main regression, observations 
of non-listed CVC parents did not allow to control for CVC total assets as a proxy for a CVC 
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parent’s size. The Pearson chi-squared test for startup IPO and related was significant at a 1% 
level. However, the marginal effect of the probit regression (Appendix 3) has a statistically 
insignificant coefficient, supporting the result of the main regression. 
A third robustness test used a 4-digit SIC code match of the CVC and the startup to compute 
the main independent variable related. The results are 67 deal observations that exhibited an 
industry relatedness (compared to 210 when using 2-digit SIC codes). A Pearson chi-squared 
test indicated a significant association of startup IPO and related on a 1% level. Aside from 
controlling for industry on a 4-digit SIC code level, the same control variables were used as in 
the main regression. Again, the results of the probit model (Appendix 4) showed no effect of 
industry relatedness in a CVC-startup dyad on the likelihood of a startup IPO.  
Finally, a last robustness test was conducted on the initial sample but using the Fama French 
12 industry classification (FF12) to calculate the variable related. FF12 enables a more 
concentrated classification of industries and is therefore of benefit when analyzing smaller 
samples (Bhojraj et al., 2003). It classifies 11 industry categories and one “other” category on 
a scale from 1 to 12. A conversion table (Appendix 5) was used to translate the SIC codes of 
the sample to FF12 codes. After conducting Pearson’s chi-squared test (p <0,001), the same 
regression model was used as in the main regression, only substituting the SIC code-based 
industry control dummies by FF12 control dummy variables. The different industry 
classification led to 236 observed deal dyads that exhibited an industry relatedness (compared 
to 210 when using 2-digit SIC code matches). In line with the previous results, the impact of 
industry relatedness on the likelihood of a startup IPO was statistically insignificant (Appendix 
6).  
5. Discussion 
This study examined the effect of industry relatedness between a CVC parent and a target 
startup on the subsequent performance of the startup. To define industry relatedness, it used a 
2-digit SIC code-based matching of the two entities to calculate the dichotomous variable 
related. As for the dependent variable, it followed previous researchers and used the IPO of 
the startup as a proxy for startup and deal performance. The model analyzed a dataset of 891 
startup deals of European headquartered CVCs, retrieved from the Thomson OneBanker 
database. The results of this paper show no significant effect of industry relatedness between a 
CVC and an invested startup on the startup’s likelihood to perform an IPO. In particular, the 
related coefficients of the marginal effects were rendered insignificant after adding industry 
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control variables which were in turn highly statistically significant. This could be partially 
explained by the observed skewed distribution of SIC industries in terms of related deal pairs 
and, foremost, in terms of startup IPOs. As already seen in the descriptive statistics section, 
certain industries not only account for a large part of the CVC investor body in this sample 
but they also exhibit the majority share of startup IPOs.  Hence, within this sample, the 
predominant drivers for a startup IPO were the industry of the CVC investors alongside the 
total funding of a startup. Apparently, industries that engage more often in CVC such as 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals are also more successful when it comes to achieving IPOs of 
the startups they invested in. While other factors might as well play a role here, it confirms the 
notion that investors that engage more frequently in CVC tend to be more successful in doing 
so (Benson & Ziedonis, 2009). Also, it is in line with previous findings such as Basu et al. 
(2011) that industries with rapid technological change and a high competitive intensity engage 
more in CVC activities like pharmaceuticals that rely heavily on new drug development or 
telecoms that stand in fierce competition with their peers for new subscribers. However, the 
dominance of relatively few industries in explaining the outcome variable of this analysis 
limits the interpretation of the results and will be further assessed in the course of this chapter. 
Subsequently performed robustness tests also exhibited insignificant results and confirmed the 
results of the main analysis.  
The study contributes to the existent literature mainly in two ways. First, it contributes to the 
explanation of potential drivers for CVC investment success by adding the concept of industry 
relatedness. While previous studies used industry relatedness to explain decision making of 
CVCs and startups ex-ante the CVC investment, this paper, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, is first to analyze on how industry relatedness can influence CVC deal outcomes 
ex post once a CVC and a startup entered a deal relationship. Secondly, it adds a European 
perspective to CVC literature. The majority of research conducted in this domain is based upon 
US datasets. European CVC activities, however, are comparably less analyzed despite the 
continent’s strong activities in CVC, especially in industries such as pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications or media. Hence, it can help providing a more balanced view on CVC 
activities on a global level as well as identifiying possible differences in CVC characteristics 
between the US and Europe.   
This thesis is subject to several limitations that need to be acknowledged. These can be grouped 
into limitations related to the dataset and methodology-related limitations. The dataset-related 
limitations concern the database Thomson OneBanker. As already mentioned previously and 
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as remarked by several scholars before, Thomson OneBanker’s database of (C)VC activities 
contains inconsistencies, missing data for certain categories and is not exhaustive of all CVC 
deals. Also, sum of the figures like investment sums or total funding of startups are subject to 
estimations. Datasets of European deals are particularly affected by this caveat, compared to 
the more exhaustive US data. While this study’s access to data was limited to the Thomson 
OneBanker database, other CVC scholars further rely on complementary databases such as 
Lexus/Nexus, Zephyr, VICO or proprietary datasets to alleviate this issue. Another dataset-
related issue is the strong concentration of certain industries like pharmaceuticals in the sample. 
While this can certainly be explained by the fact that these industries are particularly suited for 
and attracted by venture capital investments, it might also be that other industries are 
underrepresented in the dataset due to missing data. A case of non-randomly missing data, 
which would bias the results of the analysis, could not be ruled out entirely due to the private 
nature of CVC and limitations to access alternative data sources. 
Among the methodology-related caveats of this study, the first one to mention is the SIC code-
based industry relatedness calculation. The shortcomings of this method were already 
elaborated in more detail in chapter 3.2.3. Here, the classification of companies with diverse 
products and services under one SIC code is certainly one of the main caveats of the SIC code-
based approach, as well as the question on whether the SIC methodology is able to reflect the 
nature of businesses that evolved in the 21st century such as internet- or data-related business 
models. As this paper analyzed European CVCs, other classification registers like the CorpTech 
database, which only displays US businesses, could not be used.  
The second methodological limitation is the endogenous nature of the main independent 
variable industry relatedness. As illustrated in chapter 3.2.4, there are means to dissolve this 
issue like the application of a bivariate probit model with an instrumental variable regression 
as done by Park and Steensma (2012). Due to limited data available, this procedure could not 
be followed within the scope of this work and only exercised on a theoretical level. Related to 
this issue, Masulis and Nahata (2009) report that the decision of a CVC to invest in a startup 
and the type of financial contract they choose could be a result of the startup performance prior 
the investment. This ex post selection bias could imply that CVCs would only invest in startups 
that already perform well. This should be considered when measuring the impact of the nature 
of a CVC-startup dyad on the success of the CVC investment as it is done in this study. 
However, a further robustness test was not within the scope of this work considering the limited 
data on Thomson OneBanker for a startup’s pre-IPO performance and further resource 
35 
 
restrictions. Lastly, the author acknowledges that the results of this work could be subject to 
omitted variable bias, in particular, the missing of other determinant variables of a startup IPO 
that could be correlated with industry relatedness.  
The results and the nature of this study leave manifold potentials for future researchers. First, 
the concept of industry relatedness could be applied to performance measures in CVC other 
than the startup IPO, exploring possible significant impacts. Also, the use of more exhaustive 
CVC datasets could be a means to test the results of this paper. Here, time can play an important 
factor. The analyzed timeframe of this paper was 2002-2015, a time where the CVC industry 
was mainly dominated by investors from the pharmaceuticals, chemicals and telecoms sectors. 
Meanwhile, more industries engage regularly in CVC and have identified CVC as a strategic-
relevant activity to foresee possible disruptions as the examples of H&M and Ikea show 
(Financial Times, 2019). Future research could analyze this more diverse CVC investor body 
and the role of industry relatedness on the performance of its investments.  
Methodology-wise, future research can use other means to determine industry relatedness. 
These could include qualitative measurements like in-person interviews, questionnaires or the 
screening of the CVC parent’s and startup’s websites, IPO prospectus or annual reports. Also, 
more sophisticated models like the survivor principle-based approach proposed by Cefis and 
Rigamonti (2018) could be applied. The research methodology of this paper could be also 
applied to US data which, in general, is more exhaustive compared to European CVC deal data. 
Besides the higher availability of data, it would further allow to use industry classifications that 
are deemed more precise than SIC codes but that only exist for US markets, such as the 
CorpTech Directory.  
6. Conclusion 
This study could not empirically prove a significant relationship between industry relatedness 
of a CVC parent and a startup and the subsequent startup performance measured by the 
occurrence of an IPO. The results were generated by using a probit model and were further 
confirmed by several robustness tests. The sample of European CVC deals between 2002 and 
2015 exhibited a strong concentration of CVC investors from few industries like chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, the European CVC industry has more diversified and the 
increasing sums of CVC investments underline the strategic importance of CVC for traditional 
and new players in this field. In the years to come, future research could harness new data based 
on a more heterogenous CVC landscape. Together with the positive impact of related 
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investments that is largely reported in the M&A literature, this should encourage future 
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    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
 pred. P     .0644574  (at x-bar)
  obs. P     .1332454
                                                                              
_I_di~26*    .9373292   .0120148     5.14   0.000   .002639   .913781  .960878
_I_di~24*    .9595751   .0087498     6.21   0.000   .039578   .942426  .976724
_I_di~19*    .9371566   .0197282     4.28   0.000   .015831    .89849  .975823
_I_di~18*    .9392081   .0117076        .       .   .005277   .916262  .962155
_I_di~17*    .9486272   .0134908     4.90   0.000   .031662   .922186  .975069
_I_di~16*    .9652146   .0455042     5.23   0.000   .211082   .876028   1.0544
_I_di~11*    .9439226   .0170273     4.59   0.000   .026385    .91055  .977295
_I_di~10*    .9681129   .0255601     5.03   0.000   .114776   .918016  1.01821
_I_di~_7*    .9333575    .064267     6.21   0.000   .415567   .807396  1.05932
_I_di~_6*     .967708   .0197436     5.17   0.000   .097625   .929011   1.0064
_I_di~_5*    .9501378   .0159126     4.72   0.000   .038259    .91895  .981326
_Ii~2014*    .0393067   .0661205     0.67   0.502   .199208  -.090287  .168901
_Ii~2013*    .0930829   .0942295     1.28   0.202   .110818  -.091603  .277769
_Ii~2012*    .0353053   .0777554     0.52   0.601   .081794  -.117092  .187703
_Ii~2011*    .0524358   .0854596     0.74   0.461   .080475  -.115062  .219934
_Ii~2010*    .0164339   .0732049     0.24   0.807   .068602  -.127045  .159913
_Ii~2009*    .0474742   .0848246     0.67   0.503    .05409  -.118779  .213727
_Ii~2008*    -.001671   .0633068    -0.03   0.979   .077836   -.12575  .122408
_Ii~2007*    .0220319   .0706668     0.34   0.732   .077836  -.116473  .160536
_Ii~2006*    .1361437    .121974     1.54   0.124   .055409  -.102921  .375208
_Ii~2005*    .1742088   .1479617     1.69   0.092   .042216  -.115791  .464208
_Ii~2004*    .1308815   .1227651     1.47   0.141   .056728  -.109734  .371497
_Ii~2003*   -.0088507   .0601657    -0.14   0.889   .043536  -.126773  .109072
log_CV~s     .0010477   .0100328     0.10   0.917   3.87938  -.018616  .020712
CVC_le~r*    -.044151   .0301133    -1.01   0.315   .100264  -.103172   .01487
log_ag~g     .0254098    .012493     2.07   0.038   3.95153   .000924  .049896
log_to~s    -.0114566   .0216531    -0.53   0.596   2.00798  -.053896  .030983
log_ea~d     .0099197   .0190834     0.52   0.604   .782279  -.027483  .047323
log_ro~r    -.0081546   .0227531    -0.36   0.722   1.08397   -.05275  .036441
log_CV~y      .010796   .0099729     1.08   0.281   1.21609   -.00875  .030342
log_st~g     .0499922   .0117082     4.05   0.000   3.31259   .027045   .07294
CVC_li~d*   -.0582521   .0442428    -1.58   0.113   .825858  -.144966  .028462
 related*    .0090754    .021633     0.43   0.668   .261214  -.033324  .051475
                                                                              
startu~O        dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ]
                         Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286                       Pseudo R2     = 0.2435
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                        Wald chi2(32) =      .
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects           Number of obs =    758
Iteration 17:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 16: log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 15:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 14:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 13:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 12:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 11:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 10:  log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 9:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.06286
Iteration 8:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.06287
Iteration 7:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.06288
Iteration 6:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.06294
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.06312
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.06369
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.07347
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -225.67235
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -233.01032
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -297.52243
      _I_digit_CV_29 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_29 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_28 dropped and 22 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_28 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_27 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_27 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_25 dropped and 14 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_25 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_23 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_23 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_22 dropped and 2 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_22 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_21 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_21 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_20 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_20 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_15 dropped and 6 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_15 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_14 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_14 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_13 dropped and 13 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_13 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_12 dropped and 42 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_12 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_9 dropped and 8 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_9 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_8 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_8 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_4 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_4 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_3 dropped and 17 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_3 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
      _I_digit_CV_2 dropped and 1 obs not used
note: _I_digit_CV_2 != 0 predicts failure perfectly
i._digit_CVC      _I_digit_CV_1-29    (_I_digit_CV_1 for _digit_~C==01 omitted)
i.investment_~r   _Iinvestmen_2002-2014(naturally coded; _Iinvestmen_2002 omitted)
V 
 
Appendix 2 – Robustness test with subsample of listed CVCs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
related 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.0607** 0.0549** 0.0543** 0.0529** 0.0509** 0.0516** 0.0581** 0.0482* 0.0549* 0.00877 


















  (0.00893) (0.00796) (0.00781) (0.00780) (0.00788) (0.00789) (0.00775) (0.00954) (0.00954) (0.00968) (0.0136) 
log_startup_total
_funding 
  0.0688*** 0.0570*** 0.0535*** 0.0540*** 0.0458*** 0.0470*** 0.0544*** 0.0510*** 0.0452*** 0.0560*
** 
   (0.00859) (0.00919) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0129) (0.0181) 
log_CVC_total_
equity 
   0.0263*** 0.0265*** 0.0253** 0.0289*** 0.0287*** 0.0357*** 0.0331*** 0.0289** 0.0250* 
    (0.00984) (0.00977) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0138) 
log_round_numb
er 
    0.0122 0.0204 0.0138 -0.000932 0.000767 -0.00702 -0.0136 -0.0235 
     (0.0148) (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0249) (0.0300) (0.0298) (0.0294) (0.0343) 
log_earliest_roun
d 
     -0.0109 -0.0120 -0.0119 -0.0169 -0.0131 -0.00470 0.00639 
      (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0213) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0249) (0.0292) 
log_total_no_fun
ds 
      0.0220 0.0239 0.0186 0.0176 0.0218 0.00662 
       (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0240) (0.0317) 
log_age_at_finan
cing 
       0.0209 0.0256 0.0275 0.0269 0.0348* 
        (0.0143) (0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0168) (0.0185) 
log_CVC_total_
deals 
         0.0252** 0.0221* 0.00074
9 
          (0.0117) (0.0113) (0.0137) 
_Iinvestmen_200
3 
          0.0425 0.0373 
           (0.115) (0.122) 
_Iinvestmen_200
4 
          0.156 0.141 
           (0.151) (0.158) 
_Iinvestmen_200
5 
          0.247 0.241 
           (0.187) (0.202) 
_Iinvestmen_200
6 
          0.163 0.137 
           (0.153) (0.158) 
_Iinvestmen_200
7 
          0.0862 0.0457 
           (0.123) (0.115) 
_Iinvestmen_200
8 
          0.0558 0.0231 
           (0.117) (0.108) 
_Iinvestmen_200
9 
          0.127 0.0790 
           (0.141) (0.132) 
_Iinvestmen_201
0 
          0.0608 0.00415 
           (0.129) (0.103) 
_Iinvestmen_201
1 
          0.149 0.102 
           (0.147) (0.143) 
_Iinvestmen_201
2 
          0.0984 0.0523 
           (0.131) (0.123) 
_Iinvestmen_201
3 
          0.206 0.145 
           (0.152) (0.150) 
_Iinvestmen_201
4 
          0.126 0.0747 
           (0.114) (0.110) 
_I_digit_CV_3            0.00118 
            (0.102) 
_I_digit_CV_4            -0.0250 
            (0.0925) 
_I_digit_CV_5            0.127 
            (0.0851) 
_I_digit_CV_7            0.0237 
VI 
 
            (0.100) 
_I_digit_CV_12            0.0252 
            (0.0888) 
_I_digit_CV_14            0.0163 
            (0.146) 
             
Observations 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 694 640 640 640 565 






    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
 pred. P     .0653543  (at x-bar)
  obs. P     .1196953
                                                                              
_I_di~29*    .9362299   .0099703     5.55   0.000   .002176   .916688  .955771
_I_di~27*    .9637849   .0072705     6.26   0.000   .054407   .949535  .978035
_I_di~20*    .9394746   .0135088     4.82   0.000   .016322   .912998  .965951
_I_di~19*    .9382539   .0096959        .       .   .005441    .91925  .957258
_I_di~18*    .9462375   .0108286     5.44   0.000   .026115   .925014  .967461
_I_di~17*    .9618107   .0450938     5.79   0.000   .228509   .873429  1.05019
_I_di~12*    .9413138   .0162869     4.89   0.000   .023939   .909392  .973236
_I_di~11*    .9669571   .0217456     5.49   0.000   .106638   .924337  1.00958
_I_di~_8*    .9513826   .0484988     6.70   0.000   .379761   .856327  1.04644
_I_di~_7*     .970878   .0145549     5.75   0.000   .100109   .942351  .999405
_I_di~_6*    .9472195   .0145789     5.01   0.000   .033732   .918646  .975794
_I_di~_3*    .9432556   .0121662     4.69   0.000   .021763    .91941  .967101
_Ii~2014*    .0009014   .0399513     0.02   0.982    .18716  -.077402  .079204
_Ii~2013*    .0385342    .053943     0.82   0.415   .119695  -.067192   .14426
_Ii~2012*    -.012852   .0411615    -0.29   0.771    .08161  -.093527  .067823
_Ii~2011*    .0081893   .0490307     0.17   0.862    .08161  -.087909  .104288
_Ii~2010*    .0117316    .056102     0.22   0.825   .068553  -.098226  .121689
_Ii~2009*    .0231085   .0598904     0.43   0.669   .050054  -.094275  .140492
_Ii~2008*   -.0221316   .0389297    -0.49   0.622    .07617  -.098432  .054169
_Ii~2007*   -.0165444   .0389959    -0.39   0.699   .075082  -.092975  .059886
_Ii~2006*    .0727602   .0774619     1.18   0.237   .052231  -.079062  .224583
_Ii~2005*    .0815525   .0878308     1.20   0.231   .043526  -.090593  .253698
_Ii~2004*    .0243974   .0589481     0.46   0.645   .059848  -.091139  .139933
_Ii~2003*   -.0369365   .0329644    -0.83   0.404    .04679  -.101546  .027673
log_CV~s     .0020078   .0088549     0.23   0.821   3.76976  -.015347  .019363
log_to~s    -.0076262   .0163715    -0.47   0.639   1.94045  -.039714  .024461
log_ea~d      .016802   .0181122     0.93   0.352   .768383  -.018697  .052301
log_ro~r     .0158291   .0193284     0.82   0.410   1.03551  -.022054  .053712
log_st~g     .0437366   .0074361     5.68   0.000   3.10267   .029162  .058311
Listed~C*    -.029487   .0323169    -1.00   0.318   .803047  -.092827  .033853
 related*    .0061849   .0204428     0.31   0.758   .250272  -.033882  .046252
                                                                              
Startu~O        dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ]
                         Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -263.09675                       Pseudo R2     = 0.2185
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                        Wald chi2(30) =      .
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects           Number of obs =    919
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    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
 pred. P     .0643179  (at x-bar)
  obs. P     .1332454
                                                                              
_I_di~26*    .9374659    .011975        .       .   .002639   .913995  .960936
_I_di~24*    .9597873    .008515     6.71   0.000   .039578   .943098  .976476
_I_di~19*    .9370954   .0182956     4.64   0.000   .015831   .901237  .972954
_I_di~18*    .9393261      .0117     5.25   0.000   .005277   .916395  .962258
_I_di~17*     .948628   .0127761     5.20   0.000   .031662   .923587  .973669
_I_di~16*    .9644191   .0438123     5.57   0.000   .211082   .878548  1.05029
_I_di~11*    .9439028   .0158462     4.98   0.000   .026385   .912845  .974961
_I_di~10*    .9674991   .0246547     5.35   0.000   .114776   .919177  1.01582
_I_di~_7*     .934466    .059312     6.76   0.000   .415567   .818217  1.05072
_I_di~_6*    .9674066   .0182919     5.66   0.000   .097625   .931555  1.00326
_I_di~_5*    .9501122   .0149481     5.05   0.000   .038259   .920814   .97941
_Ii~2014*    .0362345   .0654119     0.62   0.535   .199208  -.091971  .164439
_Ii~2013*    .0877293   .0932909     1.21   0.228   .110818  -.095118  .270576
_Ii~2012*    .0334233   .0770645     0.50   0.619   .081794   -.11762  .184467
_Ii~2011*    .0488331   .0839291     0.69   0.488   .080475  -.115665  .213331
_Ii~2010*    .0149486   .0727848     0.22   0.825   .068602  -.127707  .157604
_Ii~2009*    .0469519   .0848375     0.66   0.509    .05409  -.119326   .21323
_Ii~2008*   -.0009564   .0641106    -0.01   0.988   .077836  -.126611  .124698
_Ii~2007*    .0213029   .0705078     0.33   0.741   .077836   -.11689  .159496
_Ii~2006*    .1342852   .1219686     1.51   0.130   .055409  -.104769  .373339
_Ii~2005*    .1753437   .1481343     1.70   0.090   .042216  -.114994  .465682
_Ii~2004*    .1316822   .1232765     1.48   0.140   .056728  -.109935    .3733
_Ii~2003*   -.0094289   .0597372    -0.15   0.881   .043536  -.126512  .107654
log_CV~s     .0012224   .0100512     0.12   0.903   3.87938  -.018478  .020922
CVC_le~r*   -.0448309   .0298896    -1.02   0.308   .100264  -.103413  .013752
log_ag~g     .0252546   .0124558     2.07   0.039   3.95153   .000842  .049668
log_to~s    -.0109857   .0216597    -0.51   0.611   2.00798  -.053438  .031467
log_ea~d     .0096312   .0189885     0.51   0.613   .782279  -.027586  .046848
log_ro~r    -.0074954   .0225978    -0.33   0.741   1.08397  -.051786  .036795
log_CV~y     .0112133   .0099916     1.12   0.264   1.21609   -.00837  .030797
log_st~g     .0494762   .0117083     4.02   0.000   3.31259   .026528  .072424
CVC_li~d*   -.0582116   .0444127    -1.58   0.115   .825858  -.145259  .028836
 related*   -.0010603   .0272395    -0.04   0.969   .084433  -.054449  .052328
                                                                              
startu~O        dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ]
                         Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -225.15344                       Pseudo R2     = 0.2432
                                                        Prob > chi2   =      .
                                                        Wald chi2(32) =      .
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects           Number of obs =    758
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Appendix 5 – FF12 industry classification conversion table 
FF12 Conversion Table 
FF12 Category SIC Codes 
01- Consumer Nondurables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, 
Apparel, Leather, Toys 
0100-0999; 2000-2399; 2700-2749; 2770-2799; 3100-3199; 
3940-3989 
02- Consumer Durables -- Cars, TVs, Furniture, Household 
Appliances 
2500-2519; 2590-2599; 3630-3659; 3710-3711; 3714-3714; 
3716-3716; 3750-3751; 3792-3792; 3900-3939; 3990-3999 
03- Manufacturing -- Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, 
Paper, Com Printing 
2520-2589; 2600-2699; 2750-2769; 3000-3099; 3200-3569; 
3580-3629; 3700-3709; 3712-3713; 3715-3715; 3717-3749; 
3752-3791; 3793-3799; 3830-3839; 3860-3899 
04- Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 1200-1399; 2900-2999 
05- Chemicals and Allied Products 2800-2829; 2840-2899 
06- Business Equipment -- Computers, Software, and 
Electronic Equipment 
3570-3579; 3660-3692; 3694-3699; 3810-3829; 7370-7379 
07- Telephone and Television Transmission 4800-4899 
08- Utilities 4900-4949 
09- Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, 
Repair Shops) 
5000-5999; 7200-7299; 7600-7699 
10- Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 2830-2839; 3693-3693; 3840-3859; 8000-8099 
11- Finance 6000-6999 
12- Other -- Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus 
Serv, Entertainment 
 





























    z and P>|z| correspond to the test of the underlying coefficient being 0
(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
 pred. P     .0597255  (at x-bar)
  obs. P     .1227217
                                                                              
_IFF1~10*    .1303829   .0502761     3.48   0.001   .291616   .031844  .228922
_IFF12~9*    .0317436   .0765287     0.49   0.627   .023086   -.11825  .181737
_IFF12~8*    .0023662   .0570252     0.04   0.966   .029162  -.109401  .114134
_IFF12~7*   -.0120953   .0323056    -0.35   0.723   .194411  -.075413  .051222
_IFF12~6*    .2481248   .1635587     2.34   0.019   .042527  -.072444  .568694
_IFF12~5*    .0671175   .0564412     1.50   0.133   .109356  -.043505   .17774
_IFF12~3*    -.025908   .0272713    -0.81   0.418   .153098  -.079359  .027543
_IFF1~_2*   -.0408239   .0273802    -0.96   0.336   .030377  -.094488   .01284
_Ii~2014*     .011884   .0491577     0.25   0.800    .18955  -.084463  .108231
_Ii~2013*    .0473076   .0678753     0.83   0.407   .111786  -.085726  .180341
_Ii~2012*    .0020958   .0518079     0.04   0.967   .085055  -.099446  .103637
_Ii~2011*    .0216204   .0613438     0.39   0.698   .085055  -.098611  .141852
_Ii~2010*   -.0061599   .0534125    -0.11   0.912   .066829  -.110846  .098527
_Ii~2009*    .0128377   .0581959     0.24   0.814   .054678  -.101224    .1269
_Ii~2008*   -.0147797   .0468227    -0.29   0.775   .076549   -.10655  .076991
_Ii~2007*   -.0068252   .0471235    -0.14   0.889   .077764  -.099186  .085535
_Ii~2006*    .0821828   .0915792     1.17   0.243   .053463  -.097309  .261675
_Ii~2005*    .1097417   .1128886     1.33   0.183   .047388  -.111516  .330999
_Ii~2004*    .0810638   .0926492     1.14   0.253   .053463  -.100525  .262653
_Ii~2003*    -.023219   .0424859    -0.46   0.646   .044957   -.10649  .060052
log_CV~s      .000632   .0083552     0.08   0.940   3.83014  -.015744  .017008
CVC_le~r*   -.0365194   .0298254    -0.90   0.370   .104496  -.094976  .021937
log_ag~g     .0252344   .0112827     2.28   0.023   3.96984   .003121  .047348
log_to~s    -.0079187   .0182488    -0.44   0.663   1.97775  -.043686  .027848
log_ea~d     .0079054   .0172336     0.46   0.648   .775275  -.025872  .041683
log_ro~r    -.0098805   .0206344    -0.47   0.635   1.07414  -.050323  .030562
log_CV~y     .0081738   .0085898     0.94   0.346   1.17979  -.008662   .02501
log_st~g     .0433906   .0092685     4.54   0.000   3.24907   .025225  .061557
CVC_li~d*   -.0384836   .0336696    -1.32   0.188   .804374  -.104475  .027507
 related*   -.0069761   .0188559    -0.36   0.716   .277035  -.043933  .029981
                                                                              
startu~O        dF/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     x-bar  [    95% C.I.   ]
                         Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -231.60513                       Pseudo R2     = 0.2441
                                                        Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
                                                        Wald chi2(30) = 121.95
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects           Number of obs =    823
